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## **A structural approach to politicisation in the Euro crisis**

Leupold, Anna

**Abstract:** Domestic opportunity structures and political actors' positions are widely regarded as the most important explanatory factors for EU politicisation. The euro crisis, however, has revealed cleavages across rather than within countries, suggesting structural factors as a potential explanation for politicisation. Based on the political economy literature on Europe's Economic and Monetary Union, this contribution develops a structural approach to politicisation with respect to countries' power and variety of capitalism. Using a content and claims analysis of business papers in Germany, France, Austria and Ireland before and during the crisis, the findings reveal a differentiated pattern of politicisation. While an expansion of actors indicates that EMU became more politicised during the crisis, polarisation remained low within countries. Countries' variety of capitalism and their perceived power in the EU largely explain the substance and objects of politicisation. The findings encourage further research considering structural explanations for differentiated politicisation in less elite-centred settings of politicisation.

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**ONLINE APPENDIX**  
for  
***A Structural Approach to Politicisation***

Anna Leupold

This online appendix contains additional tables and figures for the empirical analysis in the article “A Structural Approach to Politicisation during the Euro Crisis”.

*Appendix A: The Level of Politicisation – Comparison over Time*

TABLE A1  
NUMBER OF ARTICLES ACROSS NEWSPAPER SECTIONS  
(JANUARY – MARCH 2007 & JANUARY 2010 – MARCH 2011)

	<b>Country</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Germany</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Austria</b>	<b>Ireland</b>	
Full sample (07)	71	60	37	34	202
<i>Full sample (10)</i>	<i>183</i>	<i>129</i>	<i>69</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>409</i>
Politics (07)	26	37	20	31	114
<i>Politics (10)</i>	<i>71</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>205</i>
Editorials (07)	7	11	2	3	23
<i>Editorials (10)</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>58</i>
Economics (07)	37	12	16	0	65
<i>Economics (10)</i>	<i>81</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>149</i>
Claims sample (07)*	38	86	20	60	203


*Notes:* All number describe the rotating weekday sample comparing the time period from January up to and including March 2007 and 2010, respectively. The 2007 claims sample contains claims for all articles that were published in the politics or editorial part of the newspaper.

The decision to analyse only articles published in the politics and editorial sections of the newspapers in the claims analysis is owed to the particular structure of business papers, in which coverage in the economics section contains mainly exchange-rate and stock-exchange reporting as well as mostly technical information on individual companies and investment advice. In accordance with the study’s intention to analyse politicisation of the institutional framework of EMU and its politics and policies, content-related as well as pragmatic considerations led to the decision to focus on articles, which are most likely to contain political information on the subject. Finally, the comparison between 2007 and 2010/11 supports this decision by indicating a shift from technical reporting about EMU in the

economics section of the German *Handelsblatt* and the Austrian *Wirtschaftsblatt* to a more politicised reporting in the politics and editorial sections.

FIGURE A1

SALIENCE OVER TIME PER COUNTRY  
(JANUARY – MARCH 2007 & JANUARY – MARCH 2010)



*Appendix B: The Substance of Politicisation – Detailed Issue Coding*

The claims coding contained a detailed coding of sub-issues, which were subsumed under the larger categories of the broad policy fields ‘EMU polity’, ‘monetary policy’, ‘fiscal policy’ and ‘economic policy’. The sub-issues were deduced from the articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and complemented with new issues, which came up during the crisis and were mentioned frequently in relation to EMU in at least one of the four countries. For reasons of display, only categories accounting for a significant share of claims in all four countries are shown in tables B1 – B4, resulting in larger ‘other’-categories due to strong variance across countries and a very detailed coding for the qualitative analysis.

TABLE B1

POLITICISATION OF THE EMU POLITY BY SUB-ISSUE AND COUNTRY, 2010

<b>EMU</b>	<b>Country</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Germany</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Austria</b>	<b>Ireland</b>	
Composition	12.9	6.6	27.0	11.6	14.8
Political Union	20.0	13.1	11.1	4.7	13.1
Intra-EA relations	7.1	16.4	11.1	16.3	12.2
Multilevel issues	8.6	8.2	6.3	7.0	7.6
EA-EU relations	2.9	4.9	6.3	4.7	4.6
other	48.6	50.8	38.1	55.8	47.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	70	61	63	43	237

*Notes:* The category EMU as a political union include Eurobonds proposals.

TABLE B2

## POLITICISATION OF MONETARY POLICY BY SUB-ISSUE AND COUNTRY, 2010

<b>Monetary policy</b>	<b>Country</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Germany</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Austria</b>	<b>Ireland</b>	
Exchange rate	11.8	14.3	40.9	22.2	18.6
Price stability	9.8	17.9	22.7	7.4	14.1
Monetary financing	9.8	7.1	4.5	18.5	9.6
Interest rates	7.8	8.9	0.0	18.5	9.0
ECB staff	15.7	5.4	4.5	0.0	7.7
Int. monetary system	7.8	10.7	4.5	0.0	7.1
Collateral rules	5.9	3.6	4.5	7.4	5.1
other	31.4	32.1	18.2	25.9	28.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>156</b>

TABLE B3

## POLITICISATION OF FISCAL POLICY BY SUB-ISSUE AND COUNTRY, 2010

<b>Fiscal policy</b>	<b>Country</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Germany</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Austria</b>	<b>Ireland</b>	
<b>Finan. aid &amp; bailouts</b>	24.7	22.7	15.5	28.6	23.8
<b>National austerity</b>	15.2	22.0	31.1	18.4	20.6
<b>Gov. finances, SGP</b>	29.1	13.3	24.3	11.9	19.0
<b>SVP, EFSF, ESM</b>	8.9	16.0	16.5	7.0	11.4
<b>Debt restructuring</b>	4.4	0.7	1.9	10.8	5.0
<b>Interest rates, bonds</b>	3.8	1.3	2.9	9.7	4.9
<b>Role of IMF</b>	1.4	6.3	2.3	1.7	2.8
<b>other</b>	13.9	24.0	7.8	13.5	15.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>596</b>

*Notes:* The 'interest rates'-category refers to fiscal implications of bailout interest rates in programme countries.

TABLE B4  
POLITICISATION OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY BY SUB-ISSUE AND COUNTRY,  
2010

<b>Economic policy</b>	<b>Country</b>				<b>Total</b>
	Germany	France	Austria	Ireland	
<b>Nat. economic policy</b>	31.7	26.0	27.8	38.9	29.9
<b>Economic governance</b>	17.1	20.0	22.2	11.1	18.1
<b>Euro Plus Pact</b>	12.2	12.0	27.8	0.0	12.6
<b>Common concern</b>	4.9	8.0	16.7	16.7	9.4
<b>other</b>	34.1	34.0	5.6	33.3	29.9
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100
<b>N</b>	41	50	18	18	127

The following table contains an overview of the main topic of articles about EMU published between January and March 2007.

TABLE B5  
ISSUE SALIENCE ACROSS COUNTRIES, 2007

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Country</b>				<b>Total</b>
	Germany	France	Austria	Ireland	
<b>EMU general</b>	5.63	13.33	10.81	2.94	8.42
<b>Monetary policy</b>	47.89	50	70.27	64.71	55.45
<b>Fiscal policy</b>	12.68	18.33	5.41	8.82	12.38
<b>Economic policy</b>	5.63	8.33	0.0	2.94	4.95
<b>Other</b>	28.17	10	13.51	20.59	18.81
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100
<b>N</b>	71	60	37	34	202

*Appendix C: The Objects of Politicization Across Countries – Comparison over Time*

In the 2010/11 data set, for each claim the primary topic as well as the object of politicisation has been coded. For 2007 data set covering a three months period, the same information is only available on the article-level. Table C5 compares the quantitative results obtained from both data sets.

TABLE C1  
OBJECTS OF POLITICISATION BY ISSUE FIELD ACROSS COUNTRIES  
(JANUARY 2010 – MARCH 2011 & JANUARY – MARCH 2007)

	EMU		Monetary policy		Fiscal policy		Economic policy		Total	
	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010	2007
<b>Germany</b>										
Polity	<b>63.3</b>	75.0	<b>5.9</b>	5.9	<b>20.3</b>	0.0	<b>17.1</b>	25.0	<b>27.2</b>	0.0
Politics	<b>31.4</b>	25.0	<b>25.5</b>	5.9	<b>56.3</b>	0.0	<b>26.8</b>	0.0	<b>42.2</b>	5.0
Policies	–	-	<b>54.9</b>	44.1	<b>17.7</b>	88.9	<b>48.8</b>	25.0	<b>23.7</b>	0.0
Others	<b>4.3</b>	0.0	<b>13.7</b>	44.1	<b>5.7</b>	11.1	<b>7.3</b>	50.0	<b>6.9</b>	95.0
Total	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100
N	<b>70</b>	4	<b>51</b>	34	<b>158</b>	9	<b>41</b>	4	<b>320</b>	20
<b>France</b>										
Polity	<b>55.7</b>	87.5	<b>7.1</b>	23.3	<b>16.0</b>	9.1	<b>18.0</b>	20.0	<b>22.4</b>	0.0
Politics	<b>41.0</b>	0.0	<b>17.9</b>	16.7	<b>44.0</b>	27.3	<b>34.0</b>	0.0	<b>27.2</b>	0.0
Policies	–	12.5	<b>41.1</b>	16.7	<b>33.3</b>	63.6	<b>46.0</b>	60.0	<b>30.3</b>	0.0
Others	<b>3.3</b>	0.0	<b>33.9</b>	43.3	<b>6.7</b>	0.0	<b>2.0</b>	20.0	<b>10.1</b>	100.0
Total	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100
N	<b>61</b>	8	<b>56</b>	30	<b>150</b>	11	<b>50</b>	5	<b>317</b>	6
<b>Austria</b>										
Polity	<b>50.8</b>	75.0	<b>9.1</b>	11.5	<b>21.4</b>	50.0	<b>55.6</b>	0.0	<b>32.0</b>	0.0
Politics	<b>42.9</b>	0.0	<b>22.7</b>	0.0	<b>59.2</b>	0.0	<b>44.4</b>	0.0	<b>39.0</b>	0.0
Policies	–	-	<b>40.9</b>	34.6	<b>17.5</b>	50.0	<b>0.0</b>	0.0	<b>11.7</b>	0.0
Others	<b>6.4</b>	25.0	<b>6.4</b>	53.9	<b>1.9</b>	0.0	<b>0.0</b>	0.0	<b>7.3</b>	100.0
Total	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100
N	<b>63</b>	4	<b>22</b>	26	<b>103</b>	2	<b>18</b>	0	<b>206</b>	5
<b>Ireland</b>										
Polity	<b>41.9</b>	0.0	<b>14.8</b>	4.6	<b>13.5</b>	0.0	<b>38.9</b>	0.0	<b>19.8</b>	0.0
Politics	<b>53.5</b>	100.0	<b>7.4</b>	9.1	<b>60.0</b>	0.0	<b>44.4</b>	0.0	<b>52.8</b>	0.0
Policies	–	-	<b>44.4</b>	45.5	<b>18.4</b>	100.0	<b>0.0</b>	0.0	<b>16.8</b>	0.0
Others	<b>4.7</b>	0.0	<b>33.3</b>	40.9	<b>8.1</b>	0.0	<b>16.7</b>	100.0	<b>10.6</b>	100.0
Total	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100
N	<b>43</b>	1	<b>27</b>	22	<b>185</b>	3	<b>18</b>	1	<b>273</b>	7
Total N	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100	<b>100</b>	100
	<b>237</b>	17	<b>156</b>	112	<b>596</b>	25	<b>127</b>	10	<b>1,116</b>	38